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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1990), as this case
was transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(2)(b) (1988) provides:
"Independent contractor" means any person
engaged in the performance of any work for
another who, while so engaged, is
independent of the employer in all that
pertains to the execution of the work, is not
subject to the rule or control of the
employer, is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job or piece of work, and is
subordinate to the employer only in
effecting a result in accordance with the
employer's des ign.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(5)(a) (1988) states:
If any person who is an employer
procures any work to be done wholly or in
part for him by a contractor over whose work
he retains supervision or control, and this
work is a part or process in the trade of
business of the employer, the contractor, all
persons employed by him, all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any of
these subcontractors, are considered
employees of the original employer.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61:
Harmless error. No error in either the
admission or the exclusion of evidence, and
no error or defect in any ruling or order or
in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting
a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does
1

not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The following portions of appellant's Statement of Case
are disputed and explanations are presented in opposition or
clarification thereto.
1.

In the third paragraph of appellant's Statement of

Case, appellant claims that it acted as an agent and employee of
the State in the performance of its duties under the project.
The Engineer's Agreement (Trial Exhibit 31) stated that appellant
as engineer would act as agent for the State, for limited and
specific phases in the bidding process and in other supervisory
capacities during construction, but said contract never
designated appellant as a general agent or an employee.
Appellant should not under any circumstance be considered an
employee of the State.

Furthermore, the only control or

direction that the State exercised over appellant was in
effecting a result in accordance with the State's goals. The
Engineer's Agreement (Trial Exhibit 31) specifically established
that the appellant was an independent contractor und€*r Article
XVII.
2.

Page 4 of Appellant's Brief, in the second full

paragraph, inaccurately describes Article 22 as the
indemnification clause of the General Conditions and
Specifications (Trial Exhibit 1).

Said paragraph should be

identified properly as paragraph 28.
3.

Furthermore, the last paragraph on page 4 of

Appellant's Brief contains an improper legal argument that
2

appellant is an agent and employee of the State of Utah entitled
to the protection and benefits of indemnification under the
subject contracts.

The clear language of the indemnification

clauses of Trial Exhibit 4 and Trial Exhibit 1 clearly exclude
appellant from the benefits thereof, as more fully set forth in
the arguments hereafter.
4.

Lastly, the first paragraph on page 5 of

Appellant's Brief improperly states that the court denied
appellant's claim for contractual indemnity on the basis that
"the appellant was not an 'agent of the State' for the purposes
of governmental immunity."

The court did not refer to

governmental immunity, but merely referred to the fact that the
State was immune as an employer under worker's compensation law.
The court ruled that appellant was an independent contractor for
purposes of its claims for contractual indemnification.

(Trial

Record 98, lines 18-25.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The clear and unequivocal interpretation of the

indemnification provisions found in the General Conditions and
Specifications (Trial Exhibit 1) and the Contract between the
State of Utah and appellees (Trial Exhibit 4) limits
indemnification to the State and its agencies, departments, and
their employees, as defined in the contracts, and not appellant.
2.

The provisions of the General Conditions and

Specifications (Trial Exhibit 1, paragraph 28) further limits
appellees obligations of indemnification to claims based on
violations of any federal, state or local law, statute or
3

ordinance.

The claims of plaintiff were merely for negligence,

not for violation of such laws, statutes or ordinances.
Therefore, appellant has no right to indemnification.
3. Appellant was an independemt contractor and cannot
be considered an employee of the State. Accordingly, appellant
is not entitled to any indemnification from appellees.
4.

Even if, arguendo, the trial court should have

found appellant to be an agent of the State, such error is
harmless since the outcome would not have been affected.

The

Contract unequivocally denies indemnification to agents or
alleged agents of the State.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF
CONTRACTS REQUIRE THE COURT TO GIVE THE
CONTRACT LANGUAGE ITS PLAIN AND ORDINARY
MEANING.
The well established rules of contractual interpretation in Utah require that an objective and a reasonable
construction be given to the contract as a whole.

G.G.A., Inc.

v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1989); See also Utah
State Med. Association v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655
P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1982); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105,
1007-08 (Utah 1982).

"The cardinal rule in construing any

contract must be to give effect to the intentions of the
parties."

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229

(Utah 1987).

These intentions must be determined, if possibler

from an examination of the agreements themselves. Xd.
contract's interpretation is a question of law.
4

A

Furthermore, the

question of whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of
law.

Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm and Casualty Co,, 790

P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990).

If a contract is determined to

be ambiguous, even the interpretation of that contract is a
question of law. Id.

However, a contract is not ambiguous

merely because a party might assign a different meaning to a
particular phrase or term in accordance with that party's
interests.

Id. at 583 (citing Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit

AssJLn, 589 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979)).

Finally, the fundamental

rules of contract interpretation prohibit the court from adding,
ignoring or discarding words in a contract; rather, the court
should arrive at an interpretation of the contract by giving an
objective and reasonable construction of the contract as a whole.
Cornwall v. Willowcreek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d
928, 929 (Utah 1962).
POINT II
THE INDEMNITY PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACTS DO
NOT BENEFIT OR INCLUDE APPELLANT.
In the recent decision of Pickover v. Smith's
Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1989), this Court
confirmed the established rule that indemnity agreements are
subject to strict construction. When a party is contractually
obligated to assume the financial responsibility for the
negligence of another, the indemnity provisions will be enforced
"only when that intention is clearly and unequivocally
expressed."

Id. at 665 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso

Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah 1965)).

The Court

reiterated the presumption against the shifting of ultimate
5

financial responsibility through indemnity clauses.

Indemnity

obligations will not be inferred or implied from general
language.

Xd. See also Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal

Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983).
Appellant is basing its claim for indemnification
against appellees on the language contained in the General
Conditions and Specifications (Trial Exhibit 1), parcLgraph 28,
entitled "Indemnification," as quoted in Appellant's Brief at
11.

An accurate reading of said paragraph 28 reveals that the

persons or entities entitled to indemnification are the
"indemnities" [sic] as defined in said paragraph.

According to

paragraph 28, "indemnities" are limited to the following:
the State of Utah and all institutions,
agencies, departments, authorities, and
instrumentalities of the State of Utah, and
any member of their governing bodies, or of
their boards or commissions, or any of their
elected or appointed officers, or any of
their employees or authorized volunteers.
The indemnification provisions do not require
appellees, as contractor, to indemnify anyone other than those
"indemnities" listed above.

Even entities deemed to be agents of

those indemnities are not included by the plain language of the*
contract.

In fact, by distilling the essential elements of the

indemnification from its text, the clear construction and intent
of the indemnification clause is revealed as follows:
The contractor will . . . indemnify . . .
indemnities from every kind and character of:
damages, losses, expenses, demands, claims
and causes of action arising against
indemnities and their . . . agents,
employees, or any other person . . . from,
against or on account of any . . . claims,
damages, losses, demands . . . arising out of
6

or resulting from any violation or alleged
violation by contractor . . . of any federal,
state or local law, statute or ordinance,
relating to the work to be performed by the
contractor on the project growing out of or
incident to the work to be performed . . . by
contractor . . . under this agreement,
whether such claims . . . result from . . .
the negligence of contractor . . . or whether
resulting from . . . the concurrent
negligence of indemnities and/or their . . .
agents or employees.
As illustrated from the preceding essential language
of the indemnification, appellees are only required to indemnify
the defined "indemnities," which term does not include agents of
the State of Utah. An action against an agent of the State can
give rise to appellee's obligation to indemnify, but the
indemnification obligation extends only to the State, and not
their agents, since the agents are not listed as indemnitees.
The same indemnification language is reiterated in
Article 11 of the Contract entered into between the State of Utah
and appellees.

(Trial Exhibit 4.)

Said paragraph reads as

follows:
The Contractor agrees that it/he shall at
all times protect and indemnify and save
harmless, the State of Utah and all
institutions, agencies, departments,
authorities and instrumentalities of the
State of Utah and any member of their
governing bodies or of their boards of
commissions or any of their elected or
appointed officers or any of their employees
or authorized volunteers as described in the
general conditions of the project
specifications which are included herein by
reference, from any and all claims, damages
of every kind and nature made, rendered or
incurred by or in behalf of any person or
corporation whatsoever, including the parties
hereto and their employees that may arise,
occur or grow out of any acts, actions, work
or other activity done by the said contractor
7

in the performance and execution of this
contract.
A second and equally impelling reason for the rejection
of appellant's appeal is found in the language of the
indemnification itself. Appellees agreed to indemnify only the
"indemnities" for any action "arising out of or resulting from
any violation or alleged violation by contractor . . . of any
federal, state or local law, statute or ordinance relating to the
work . . • •"
added).

(See Trial Exhibit 1, paragraph 28) (emphasis

The allegations of the Complaint brought by David

Gordonf the plaintiff in the underlying case, were based solely
upon negligence.

There was no contractual obligation, cause of

action or evidence made or presented at trial that claimed as
its basis the violation of any federal, state or local statute or
ordinance relating to the work.
For the reasons set forth above, the clear and
unequivocal language of the indemnification precludes any claim
by appellant for contractual indemnification against appellees.
The terms of the applicable indemnity provisions of the contracts
apply only to the State and its agencies, as defined in the
contracts.

It does not apply to any agents1 in the position of

appellant.

1

This assumes merely for the sake of argument, that
appellant may have been an agent. Appellees assert that
insufficient evidence was introduced at trial or in appellant's
Motion for Summary Judgment to support the general cillegation
that appellant was an agent of the State. As demonstrated above,
however, it is irrelevant whether appellant was an agent since
the contracts afford no indemnification to agents.

8

POINT III
APPELLANT IS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF THE STATE.
Appellees submit that they have established in the
above arguments an adequate basis for this Court to affirm the
trial court's rejection of appellant's claims for
indemnification.

Furthermore, appellant is unable to establish

a right of indemnification by failing to prove its status as an
employee of the State of Utah.

Using only self-serving

rhetoric, appellant argues that it is a "statutory employer" of
the State of Utah within the definition of the Utah Worker's
Compensation Act.

The definition of "statutory employer" is only

applicable and is confined to cases brought under the Worker's
Compensation Act.

Because of the unique system of compensation

and liability devised by the legislature to govern the
relationship of injured workers and employers in Utah, specific
and unique definitions have been derived to carry out those
goals.

The case on appeal did not arise under the provisions of

the Utah Worker's Compensation Act.

Even if, arguendo, appellant

were able to inject the Utah Worker's Compensation Act's
definition of employee into this case, appellant entirely fails
in its proof that the State retained supervision or control over
appellant as required by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(5)(a) (1988).
To the contrary, the Engineer's Agreement clearly sets forth in
Article XVII that the engineer "will be considered an independent
contractor."

(See Trial Exhibit 31.) Appellant and the State

entered into the Engineer's Agreement as an arms-length contract
wherein the appellant, as engineer, agreed to perform independent
9

engineer's services as specified in the contract, independent of
the State as to aspects pertaining to the execution of the work,
and without being subject to the rule or control of the State,
except in achieving and effecting the result contemplated by the
contract:

the design, bidding and supervision of the

construction of the storm drain facilities at the State Training
School in American Fork.
"Independent contractor" is defined by Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-42(2)(b) (1988) as follows:
[A]ny person engaged in the performance of
any work for another who, while so engaged,
is independent of the employer in all that
pertains to the execution of the work, is not
subject to the rule or control of the
employer, is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job or piece of work, and is
subordinate to the employer only in effecting
a result in accordance with the employer's
design.
Within the context of worker's compensation issues, it is
important to determine who may or may not be an employer, an
employee or an independent contractor, for the limited purposes
of assessing liability for compensation or immunity from thirdparty claims. However, these definitions cannot be used to
bolster appellant's claim for indemnification.
The concept of statutory employer or employee has been
essentially eviscerated by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989).

The

Court clearly held that only an employer who actually pays
compensation to an injured employee under the Worker's
Compensation Act, and that employer's officers, agent and
employees, are shielded by the exclusive remedy immunity provided
10

by § 35-1-60 Utah Code Annotated (1988).

Id. at 431. Obviously,

appellant is not attempting to assert the exclusive remedy
immunity under § 35-1-60.

Therefore, any attempts to apply the

definition of employee under the Worker's Compensation Act for
purposes of establishing a right to indemnification against
appellees are unwarranted and should be denied.
POINT IV
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE RULING OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS TO
ALLOW CLAIMS OF CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY.
Although appellant accuses the trial court of confusing
the concepts of immunity and indemnity, it is apparent that the
appellant in fact has incorrectly interpreted the rulings of the
court.

Appellant claims that it previously had filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment seeking a determination that it was entitled
to protection of "governmental immunity under the Worker's
Compensation Act." (Appellant's Brief at 15.) Again, appellant
claims that the trial court denied appellant's attempts at trial
to present evidence relating to contractual indemnity "because
for purposes of governmental immunity appellant was not an agent
of the State and to be consistent in the proceedings the court
could not for purposes of indemnity prove that the appellant was
an agent of the State." (Id.)

The issue of governmental

immunity was never raised, argued or used as a basis for any of
the court's rulings. Appellant attempted to obtain dismissal by
its Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing its status as a
"statutory employer" under the Worker's Compensation Act for
which immunity, if proper, would have obtained in the action by a
11

third party, David Gordon.

The court properly denied appellant's

motion on the basis of Pate v. Marathon.

(See Exhibit "B" to

Appellant's Brief.)
Likewise, the trial court denied appellant's claim for
contractual indemnity in its post-trial decision on September 27,
1989.

It reasoned that appellant did not stand in any employer-

employee relationship with the State consistent with its previous
ruling denying the Motion for Summary Judgment.

(See Exhibit "C"

attached to Appellant's Brief.)
Even if this Court were to find that Judge Ballif
should have found appellant to be an agent of the State, such
error would be harmless. Harmless errors are those which are so
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
error affects the outcome of the case.
116, 120 (Utah 1989).

State v. Verdes, 770 P.2d

Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure states that no error in admission or exclusion of
evidence or in any ruling is ground for disturbing a judgment
"unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice."

Id.

Notwithstanding the reasons given by Judge Ballif for
denial of appellant's claim for contractual indemnity, and
appellant's attempts to present those claims to the jury, the
trial court's rulings should be affirmed since the language of
the contract unequivocally precludes appellant as an indemnitee,
even if it were to be considered an agent of the State.

12

CONCLUSION
The unambiguous and clear language of the
indemnification clauses specifically limits any obligation of
indemnification by appellees to the State of Utah, its
institutions, agencies, departments, authorities and
instrumentalities, members of their governing board, their boards
or commissions or any of their elected or appointed officers or
any of their employees or authorized volunteers. Appellant,
working as an independent contractor under the Engineer's
Agreement, does not qualify as a named indemnitee under the
contracts, and therefore, is not entitled to any rights of
indemnification.

Furthermore, appellant's attempts to establish

status as a State employee under the Worker's Compensation Act is
without authority and should be denied by this Court, because of
the unassailable construction of the indemnification clauses of
the contracts. Utah rules requiring strict construction of
indemnification clauses preclude any claim for indemnification by
appellant.
Appellees respectfully prays that this Court affirm
the trial court's denial of appellant's claim for contractual
indemnification and that appellant's request for remand to the
trial court for a determination of the damages, attorney's fees
and costs be denied.

13
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